Looking for something specific?
 
Home Research In-Depth Reports The Demographic, Social and Human Rights Consequences of U.S. Cuts in Population Control Funding: A Reassessment
The Demographic, Social and Human Rights Consequences of U.S. Cuts in Population Control Funding: A Reassessment PDF Print E-mail
Written by PRI   
Tuesday, 05 March 1996 19:00

Executive Summary

The potential effect of the 35% cut in U.S. funding for population control programs is estimated by gathering information from a wide variety of sources, ranging from national censuses and population estimates to interviews with former population control officials and victims of coercive population control programs. The principal findings of this study are that:

  • Increases in population control pledges by other countries will largely offset the U.S. cuts.
  • The demographic consequences of the U.S. cuts will be negligible. Claims that numbers of abortions and maternal deaths will increase as a result are greatly exaggerated, if not entirely spurious.
  • Human rights abuses associated with population control programs, such as coerced abortion, sterilization, and contraception, will decline.
  • The U.S. will reap diplomatic benefits by reducing its involvement in programs which often violate the rights of poor women, offend the sensibilities of underdeveloped countries, and raise the spectre of cultural imperialism, if not outright neocolonialism.

Background:

In January 1996, the U.S. Congress agreed upon, and President Clinton signed into law a 35% cut in U.S. funding for population control programs. Under the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act passed in January, Rep. Chris Smith's amendment reinstating the Mexico City Policy and withholding funds from UNFPA was dropped from the FY 1996 Foreign Operations appropriations bill. Instead, a three-part agreement was reached that:

1. No appropriated funds could be spent for population control activities (including contributions to UNFPA) before July 1, 1996, unless the expenditures were specifically authorized by law;

2. After July 1 (if there is no authorization), 65% of FY 1995 funding levels could be spent during the remainder of FY 1996 and through FY 1997 (15 months);

3. No more than 1/15th of the total amount of funds available could be spent each month.

The debate over the likely consequences of such cuts involves the gathering and interpretation of a wide variety of demographic, societal, and human rights data. This information comes from national censuses and population estimates as well as from interviews with former population control officials and victims of coercive population control programs. The following summary report describes the principal demographic, social, and human rights consequences of the reduction in funding. More detailed information is available upon request.

Worldwide Population Control Spending will not Decline Significantly:

It must be pointed out at the outset that a number of nations, including Great Britain, Australia, Belgium, and others, have recently increased their funding of population control programs, and that these increases have in large part offset the U.S. cutback. Static analyses that do not take this dynamic into account, but instead rely on simplistic, straight-line projections, are inherently inaccurate and misleading. A recent example of such a static, and hence flawed, analysis is the study produced by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI) addressing the same topic as the current study.

The Demographic Consequences will be Muted:

As pointed out above, it is impossible to estimate the demographic impact of the U.S. funding cut without taking into account the increase in the amount of population control funds pledged by other countries. Since the UNFPA and other population organizations continue to solicit such contributions, it is difficult to determine with any accuracy the level that population control spending will reach during the coming year, but it is reasonable to assume that it will not decrease by more than 10% over 1995. While AGI's estimates are flawed in a number of respects, correcting for this 25% error in funding levels alone would reduce its predicted increase in births, abortions, and maternal deaths by 70%.

The effect of a 10% reduction in worldwide population control spending on birth rates, abortion rates, and female mortality rates is difficult to assess, but there is reason to believe that the effect on abortion rates and female mortality rates would be negligible.

  • Birth rates may slightly increase, although this effect would be muted by the widespread availability of contraceptives, both modern and traditional, in Third World countries. Even if one assumes, as does AGI, that 2.0 million women would turn to traditional methods or use no contraceptive at all, the pregnancy rate of 65% that AGI presupposes is far too high. According to AGI's own data, the probability of pregnancy after one year using no contraceptives is only 44.7%, while with traditional methods such as Ârhythm' and withdrawal it is 23% and 15.4%, respectively. Thus the actual pregnancy rate would be perhaps 32%, or half of what AGI assumes.
  • The number of surgical sterilizations performed would be reduced. Performed in the often unsanitary setting of a Third World clinic, more often than not in assembly-line fashion, such operations can be fatal. Decreasing the mortality rates from surgical abortion would partially offset the additional deaths due to pregnancy.
  • Maternal mortality rates in developing countries are much lower than the figure given by the AGI of 4.1 per 1,000 women. The actual figure for the 116 developing nations of the world, taken from 1994 U.N. data, is 2.77. (See attached ÂAnalysis of Maternal Mortality Rates in the 116 Developing Counties') In other words, the maternal mortality rate used by AGI is as much as 50 percent too high.
  • The demographic consequences of the U.S. cuts will therefore be negligible.

Human Rights Abuses Associated with Population Control Programs will Decline:

Coercion—even violence—in the name of 'family planning' has occurred in at least 35 developing countries to date. The best-known instances of coercion have occurred in China and India, but coercive population control is far more common in the Third World than is generally realized:

  • In Salvadorian hospitals, clinics and fieldworkers are given monthly targets for the number of sterilizations they are to carry out, and women are sterilized without their knowledge or consent.
  • Many Cambodian women have been told that they cannot marry unless they first receive an injection of the abortifacient Depo-Provera.
  • Black South African women are given Depo shots by health care workers who tell them that the injections will "help their milk supply," and Black women cannot apply for jobs unless they present a family planning card showing that they are on some type of birth control. This widespread abuse has not ended with the demise of apartheid- in fact; there are indications that the architects of South Africa's coercive family planning programs will broaden their scope to target the "colored" (mixed race) population as well.
  • In the 1970s, the Indonesian military was employed in a drive to get as many women as possible fitted with IUDs (half of whom were directly coerced), and school teachers were told that they would not be paid unless they were on birth control.
  • In 1983, Bangladeshi Army troops forcibly rounded up women with three or more children and trucked them to camps for sterilization, and the following year, during widespread flooding, foreign food and medical aid was withheld from destitute women until they agreed to be sterilized.

In the implementation of population control programs, the theory of "gradiated coercion" is employed. By this is meant the application of successively greater degrees of coercion until the target population complies with the goals of the program. This process has been explicitly described by population control advocates Bernard Berelson and Jonathan Lieberson. "The degree of coercive policy brought into play should be proportional to the degree of seriousness of the present problem and should be introduced only after less coercive means have been exhausted," Berelson and Lieberson write. "Thus, overt violence or other potentially injurious coercion is not to be used before noninjurious coercion has been exhausted." Note that coercion is not proscribed, but merely reserved until such time as other inducements to compliance have proven ineffective.

There are more than one hundred other documented cases of compulsion associated with family planning programs from thirty other countries. Such violations of human rights are not isolated instances, but are evidence that force, and the threat of force, are in integral part of population control programs worldwide.

The U.S. will Gain by Reducing its Involvement in Programs which Egregiously Violate Individual and Family Rights, as well as National Sovereignty.

Population control programs not only routinely violate the rights of poor women, they also offend the sensibilities of underdeveloped countries, and smack of cultural imperialism, if not outright neocolonialism.

In underdeveloped countries, power is often concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and government agencies, which are easily swayed by promises of money and assistance. There are rural clinics in the Philippines where contraceptives—paid for by U.S. taxpayers—are piled to the rafters, but there are no antibiotics or vaccines to be found? There are poor men and women in India and other countries who are bribed or coerced into sterilizations they quickly come to regret, or did not want in the first place? There is increasing resentment in Third World countries over demands by the wealthy First World that they reduce their birth rates.

It is Time for a Comprehensive Reexamination of Population Control Programs.

Ideologically driven movements are notoriously ill equipped to examine their own assumptions. The population control movement, which is based on the conjecture that the world has—or will soon have—more people than it can reasonably sustain, is no exception. It accepts as an article of faith the existence of something called "overpopulation." It claims that it is principal cause of hunger, poverty, and environmental degradation. Finally—frightening those of us who are familiar with China's one-child policy—it zealously urges Third World governments to adopt measures to force down birth rates.

Outside of the "movement" itself all these notions are being called into question. Does "overpopulation" demand population control activism? Listen to Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute: "[T]here is no workable demographic definition of Âoverpopulation'," he states flatly. "The term, though often used as if it had a fixed meaning, cannot be described unambiguously through reference to any combination of demographic variables. . . . Inadequate incomes, poor health, malnutrition, overcrowded housing, unemployment—images such as these are conjured up by the notion of overpopulation, but they are really images of poverty. . ."

Does population growth leads to ever-increasing hunger, poverty, and environmental degradation? Consider a recent study by Julian Simon and Karl Zinsmeister, which concludes that the success of a country's development depends largely on its political and economic system, not on the size or rate of growth of its population. As far as the relationship between population and development is concerned, Simon and Zinsmeister maintain, "[it] is the reverse of what population-explosionists argue: it is not that slower population growth brings prosperity, but rather that prosperity brings slower population growth."

Given that the population controllers may have gotten it all wrong, is it wise for the U.S. to urge Third World governments in no uncertain terms to restrict their peoples' fertility? Does it make sense to ship massive amounts of contraceptives around the world? Do these programs empower poor people—as their proponents claim—or simply make society's have-nots vulnerable to yet another form of official exploitation and abuse?

Before we continue to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into population programs, we should first determine whether such programs help or hurt their supposed beneficiaries. And until we can answer this question satisfactorily, we should cut off, not merely cut back, funding.

For if Eberstadt, Simon, Zinsmeister and company are correct, the real danger to men, women, and children of the Third World may not be "overpopulation" at all, but rather alarmist visions of overpopulation. The notion that people are somehow social, ecological, and economic nuisances is a pernicious one, predisposing governments to treat their own citizens as a form of pestilence. Instead of trying to lift their poor out of poverty, governments instead try to reduce their numbers. Authentic economic development is neglected, and everyone's freedoms are put at risk.


ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(Updated version of March 13, 1996)

Country and Area [1] GNP Per Capita [2]
(1994 $US)
Maternal Mortality
Rate Per 100,000
Live Births [3]
Nation's 1995
Population
in Thousands [4]

Afghanistan (SEA)

725

640

23481
Albania (EUR) 360 *** 3535
Algeria (NAF) 1690 136 28144
Angola (WAF) 1810 *** 10636
Armenia (CAS) 670 33 3800
Azerbaijan (CAS) 500 11 7640
Bangladesh (SEA) 230 600 121110
Belarus (EUR) 2160 31 10372
Belize (CAM) 2550 65 215
Benin (WAF) 370 161 5470
Bhutan (SEA) 400 1305 1605
Bolivia (SAM) 770 600 8075
Bosnia and Herzegovina 725 11 4383
Botswana (EAF) 2800 250 1483
Brazil (SAM) 3370 200 161374
Bulgaria (EUR) 1160 9 8411
Burkina Faso (WAF) 300 810 10439
Burundi (EAF) 150 *** 6301
Cambodia (SEA) 725 500 9756
Cameroon (WAF) 680 430 13368
Cape Verde (WAF) 910 107 417
Central African Republic 370 600 3403
Chad (WAF) 190 960 6448
Chile (SAM) 3560 67 14241
China, People's Republic 530 50 1199332
Colombia (SAM) 1620 200 35101
Comoros (EAF) 510 500 566
Congo, People's Republic (WAF) 640 900 2673
Costa Rica (CAM) 2380 36 3405
Cote d'Ivoire (WAF) 510 *** 14342
Croatia (EUR) 2530 11 4785
Cuba (CAR) 1810 39 10992
Czech Republic (EUR) 3210 *** 10374
Djibouti (EAF) 1810 740 633
Dominica (CAR) 2830 62 73
Dominican Republic (CAR) 1320 100 7701
Ecuador (SAM) 1310 170 11721
Egypt, Arab Republic (NAF) 710 266 57741
El Salvador (CAM) 1480 59 5669
Equatorial Guinea (WAF) 430 900 467
Eritrea (EAF) 725 *** 3574
Estonia (EUR) 2820 31 1541
Ethiopia (EAF) 130 *** 56548
Fiji (OCE) 2320 68 775
Gabon (WAF) 3550 190 1306
Gambia (WAF) 360 1500 1071
Georgia (CAS) 725 21 5441
Ghana (WAF) 430 1000 . . .17236
Grenada (CAR) 2620 64 91
Guatemala (CAM) 1190 240 10602
Guinea-Bissau (WAF) 240 700 1084
Guinea (WAF) 510 800 6618
Guyana (SAM) 530 200 824
Haiti (CAR) 220 340 7090
Honduras (CAM) 580 221 5924
Hungary (EUR) 3840 17 10206
India (SEA) 310 460 934228
Indonesia (SEA) 880 400 192543
Iran (SEA) 1810 120 64805
Iraq (SWA) 1810 117 21038
Jamaica (CAR) 1420 115 2454
Jordan (SWA) 1390 40 4407
Kazakstan (CAS) 1110 48 17339
Kenya (EAF) 260 168 27751
Kiribati (OCE) 730 *** 79
Korea, Democratic Republic (SEA) 1810 *** 23927
Kyrgystan (CAS) 610 56 4636
Lao PDR (SEA) 320 300 4774
Latvia (EUR) 2290 24 2602
Lebanon (SWA) 1810 *** 4005
Lesotho (EAF) 700 1600 1985
Liberia (WAF) 725 173 2379
Lithuania (EUR) 1350 23 3743
Macedonia, FYR (EUR) 790 11 2228
Madagascar (EAF) 230 570 13485
Malawi (EAF) 140 167 9727
Malaysia (SEA) 3520 40 19876
Maldives (SEA) 900 480 251
Mali (WAF) 250 2325 9833
Mauritania (WAF) 480 *** 2255
Mauritius (EAF) 3180 99 1133
Mexico (CAM) 4010 82 90464
Micronesia, Federated States (OCE) 1890 *** 115
Moldova, Republic of (EUR) 870 26 4357
Mongolia (SEA) 340 204 2497
Morocco (NAF) 1150 250 27724
Mozambique (EAF) 80 300 17732
Myanmar (SEA) 725 460 46759
Namibia (EAF) 2030 *** 1647
Nepal (EAF) 200 850 21406
Nicaragua (CAM) 330 300 4212
Niger (WAF) 230 700 9037
Nigeria (WAF) 280 800 111273
Pakistan (SEA) 440 400 129704
Panama (CAM) 2670 60 2660
Papua New Guinea (OCE) 1160 700 4345
Paraguay (SAM) 1570 300 4940
Peru (SAM) 1890 300 23681
Philippines (SEA) 960 74 69209
Poland (EUR) 2470 13 38492
Romania (EUR) 1230 83 22805
Russian Federation (EUR) 2650 52 148940
Rwanda (EAF) 725 210 7794
Samoa, Western (OCE) 970 400 190
Senegal (WAF) 610 600 8468
Sierra Leone (WAF) 150 450 4707
Slovak Republic (EUR) 2230 *** 5414
Solomon Islands (OCE) 800 *** 371
Somalia (EAF) 725 1100 . . . .8994
South Africa (EAF) 3010 84 42505
Sri Lanka (SEA) 640 80 18079
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (CAR) 2120 *** 111
St. Lucia (CAR) 3450 *** 163
St. Kitts and Nevis (CAR) 4760 *** 41
Sudan (NAP) 725 550 28776
Suriname (SAM) 870 *** 410
Swaziland (EAF) 1160 120 946
Syrian Arab Republic (SWA) 1810 143 14284
Tajikistan (CAS) 350 53 6002
Tanzania (EAF) 725 342 28463
Thailand (SEA) 2210 37 60460
Togo (WAF) 320 420 4266
Tonga (OCE) 1640 *** 95
Trinidad and Tobago (CAR) 3740 111 1305
Tunisia (NAF) 1800 70 9031
Turkey (SWA) 2450 146 61284
Turkmenistan (CAS) 1810 46 4124
Uganda (EAF) 200 300 19156
Ukraine (EUR) 1570 32 51932
Uruguay (SAM) 4650 36 3179
Uzbekistan (CAS) 950 33 23028
Vanuatu (OCE) 1150 107 169
Venezuela (SAM) 2760 200 21883
Vietnam (SEA) 190 120 74109
West Bank and the Gaza Strip (SWA) 1810 *** 1944
Yemen (SWA) 280 330 14244
Yugoslavia Fed. Rep. (EUR) 1810 10 10821
Zaire (EAF) 725 *** 43436
Zambia (EAF) 350 151 9072
Zimbabwe (EAF) 490 77 11105
Category
Number of Nations
Population
(Thousands)
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 Live Births)

All Developing Nations
118
4,524,133
260
Minus European Nations
103
4,198,515
277
Also Minus P.R. China
102
2,999,183
367

Notes:

[1] Areas are from Eduard Bos, My T. Vu, Ernest Massiah, and Rodolfo A. Bulatao. World Population Projections 1994-5. Published for the World Bank by Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994. Areas are CAM -Central America; CAR - Caribbean; CAS - Central Asia; EAF - Eastern Africa; EUR - Europe; NAF - Northern Africa; OCE - Oceania; SAM - South America; SEA - Eastern and Southeastern Asia; SWA - Southwestern Asia; WAF - Western Africa; and WAS - Western Asia. See Table 7, Total Population, Estimates and Projections for All Countries and Economies, 1990-2030. pages 18-21.

[2] For the purpose of this analysis, developing countries are defined as those that average less than $5000 U.S. dollars (1994) of Gross National Product (GNP) for each citizen of the country. 1994 U.S. dollars of GNP per capita are extracted from The World Bank Atlas - 1996. Washington, D.C., 1995, table entitled The Economy, pages 18-19. Those countries designated as Estimated to be lower middle income ($726 to $2,895). are given the midrange values of $1810. These countries are Angola, Cuba, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Korea, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Yugoslavia.

[3] Maternal mortality rates are extracted from United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Population Division. Wall chart entitled World Abortion Policies 1994. Countries for which maternal mortality information is not available are marked *I*.

[4] Same as reference [1].